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Adaptive learning and coloniality in birds
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We introduce here three complementary models to analyze the role of predation pressure in avian
coloniality. Different explanations have been proposed for the existence of colonial breeding behavior
in birds, but field studies offer no conclusive results. We first propose a learning model in which the
decision of birds are taken according to the collective performance. The properties of the system are
then studied according to a model in which birds choose according to their individual experience,
and the agreement of the introduction of spatial structure with field data are then shown.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years there has been an increasing inter-
est in the understanding of learning processes of collective
behavior, specially in systems of interacting agents. The
aim of these studies is to reproduce qualitatively features
of economic or biological systems [1, 2].
Colonial breeding behavior in birds has been exten-
sively studied [3, 4, 5]. During the breeding season ver-
tebrate social systems can be behaviorally classified into
three main groups: territorial, cooperative and colonial.
This classification is according to the genetical relation-
ship with the other members of the colony, and to the
spatial organization. While territorial and cooperative
behavior are evolutionary understood, colonial behav-
ior remains an open question. Different hypotheses have
been put forward in order to explain this behavior, like
minimizing the distance required for foraging [6], obser-
vation of conspecific foraging groups [7, 8, 9], information
transfer at the colony [10], shortage of nests [11, 12], or
predation pressure [3].
One of the difficulties in verifying the previous hy-
potheses is that present day conditions need not to co-
incide with those which lead to colonial behavior in the
first place. Thus, modelling of bird populations using
reasonable assumptions for bird behavior can be useful
in the elucidation of possible scenarios favorable towards
the evolution of coloniality.
Some theoretical studies give support to the hypothe-
sis that information transfer at the colony increases the
tendency towards colony formation [13, 14, 15]. How-
ever this hypothesis requires the previous existence of a
group or colony, and therefore it cannot explain by itself
the evolution towards colonial behavior.
Predation can induce colonial habits in many ways.
The simplest passive mechanism is the dilution effect pro-
vided by a colony of sufficiently large size [16, 17, 18]. In
addition, the detection and defense capabilities are en-
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hanced in colonies [16, 18, 19, 20, 21]. On the other
hand, the lack of significant predation pressure on some
colonial species has been used as evidence against the
predation hypothesis [17, 22], although a phylogenetic
analysis of coloniality across bird species shows a strong
correlation with exposure to predation in the past [5].
The present work analyzes the role of predation on the
formation of colonial habits by means of a mathematical
model which incorporates some of the known facts about
the response of birds to attacks by predators, and makes
simple assumptions about the memory and learning pro-
cesses at play.
II. MODELLING LEARNING PROCESSES IN
SOCIAL SYSTEMS
A. Minority Game and Individual Minority Game
We model birds experience in a similar way to that
used in the “Minority Game” (MG) model [24, 25, 26,
27, 29]. The minority game was introduced in the analy-
sis of decision making by agents with bounded rationality,
derived from “El Farol” bar problem [23, 29]. The model
describes N agents which must make a choice between
two alternatives (originally defined as {0, 1}, later on de-
scribed as {−1, 1}). Agents make choices using as input
the preceding collective performance. A successful choice
for an agent is that which no more than half the total of
agents choose. The bounded capacity of each agent is
modelled assuming that agents can only remember the
last m rounds of the game. This time span defines 2m
possible outcomes which each agent needs to consider.
Hence, the number of strategies that the agents can use
is 22
m
, each of which is a set of choices for each possible
previous outcome. To keep the assumption of bounded
rationality, agents have a limited number s of strategies,
taken at random (in most studies, s = 2). Each strategy
has an independent score, which is updated after each
move, according to its performance.
The game is defined by three parameters: N , the
number of agents, m, the number of time steps agents
use to determine the next decision, and s, the num-
ber of strategies available to each agent. Depending
on the ratio α = 2m/N , a phase transition has been
2Signal Decision
11 1
10 1
01 0
00 1
TABLE I: Example of strategy, for m = 2
found [30, 31, 32, 33]. This transition has been success-
fully analyzed using replica symmetry breaking and dy-
namical mean field theory methods [31, 33]. The phase
at α ≪ 1 has many agents which are able to identify
the “optimal” strategies, leading to a poor global per-
formance, as the minority group is usually small. For
α≫ 1, agents play almost at random, as the total num-
ber of strategies being used is a small fraction of the total
number possible. Near the phase transition, there is a sit-
uation where groups of agents tend to play anticorrelated
strategies, and the global performance has a maximum.
The model has been generalized in different directions
(see [27]). There are different versions in which the agents
are allowed to evolve. The strategies with which each
agent is endowed can be considered its “genotype”, and
can be allowed to change. Alternatively, each agent can
have an extra character, which allows it to favor a given
strategy or its opposite [34].
The main objective of the present work, as described
previously, is the modelling of processes which lead to in-
dividual or collective behavior and which are determined
by responses to unexpected events, like predation. While
the generic pattern of response can be genetically defined,
we will concentrate on the adaptation to the habitat
which takes place during the lifetime of each individual,
using the agent’s past experience only. Hence, our start-
ing point will be a variation of the minority game in which
the information used by each agent is not taken from the
collective history, but from the agent’s own choices and
perfomance [28]. We define this version of the minority
game as the individual minority game. Previous studies
show that the use of different sources of information by
different agents change significantly their behavior in the
α ≪ 1 region, where some of the “herding” effects de-
scribed in this section are avoided. On the other hand,
the fact that the information used by each agent cannot
be considered a random input [35], makes it difficult to
use analytical techniques.
B. Coloniality by predation
In our approach to colonial behavior we assume that
the available choices to birds are limited to two possi-
bilities each breeding season: they can either form an
individual nest, or join an existing colony. Therefore we
find a binary system of decisions, equivalent to the MG
model.
Successful breeding individuals tend to be faithful to
their previous nesting site. Birds choose a colony or an
isolated nest depending on their previous experience.
Each season, birds can be predated with probability p.
We take as our unit a breeding couple. A predation event
does not imply the birds which form the predated pair
are removed from the population, but that the nest suf-
fers predation from small animals (rats, snakes, etcetera)
which eat or damage the eggs. Therefore, the reproduc-
tive success of the couple is zero or small, and they learn
from the experience. These “small” predation events are
much more common in nature than those which involve
big predators, such as mammals, which can destroy the
whole colony. The birds have a finite lifetime, which
limits their ability for learning (see below), which is not
related to predation. The objective of the present work
is the study of simplified learning schemes by which birds
can aggregate in colonies, and this learning mechanism
can only occur when birds survive to predation. Hence,
“big” predation events are irrelevant for this purpose.
Each bird has, as already mentioned, s strategies (see
table I for example of a strategy of memorym = 2). Each
of these strategies has a score, which reflects the innate
preferences of each bird, or the degree of reproductive
success that the bird would have had if it had followed
it.
We consider different scoring mechanisms, as the avail-
able biological data can be interpreted in different ways.
We first assume that this score is updated using collec-
tive information from the performance of all individuals.
Next, we analyze the case when each bird updates the
scores of its strategies using information from its own
success in previous occasions. Hence, each bird uses in-
formation different from that used by other birds, and
the model departs from the minority game usually an-
alyzed in the literature, where the score of strategies is
the same for all agents.
The finite lifespan of the birds is modelled with a prob-
ability of setting the scores of the strategies of a bird to
zero p = 1
v
at each time step, where v is the average lifes-
pan of the birds. This is equivalent to introduce a new
bird with no previous experience, and allows us to keep
the population size constant.
III. RESULTS
A. Collective scoring model
We first study a scoring scheme in which the collective
traits used in the standard minority game are combined
with the use of information private to each individual.
The scores are updated according to the following rules:
i) The scores corresponding to strategies which lead to
the outcome not chosen by the bird are updated accord-
ing to their average success among the birds which have
followed them, ii) The scores corresponding to the strate-
gies which lead to the actual choice taken by the bird are
updated according to the success obtained by the bird
3Choice Success ∆i ∆c
Individual
Predated
Not Predated
0
2
1− 2× p/N
Colonial
Predated
Not Predated
2× (1− p)
1− 2/nc
1
TABLE II: Collective scoring, where N is the number of birds,
p is the predation probability and nc is the number of colonial
birds. ∆i is the increase on the score of an individual strategy
and ∆c is the increase on the score of a colonial strategy.
at that season. We assume that, in the absence of pre-
dation, the innate tendency of the birds is such that the
score assigned to strategies leading to individual behavior
is twice that for colonial behavior.
This choice of scores takes into account the innate ten-
dency of many birds towards an individual behavior [18].
The dilution effect, which favors colonial behavior in the
presence of predation, is included in two ways: i) birds
which choose an individual behavior update the scores
of the strategies leading to colonial behavior taking into
account the dilution effect which exists in a large colony
which includes all the birds and ii) birds which choose a
colonial behavior are predated less often, depending on
the size of the colony to which they are in, which we
assume to include all colonial birds.
We have studied this model for different values of the
parameters, and we have found that the same qualitative
features as we vary the number of strategies s available
to each bird or its memory m. Typical results are shown
in fig. 1.
It is interesting to consider the case of infinite lifes-
pan, although biologically unrealistic, shown in fig. 2.
Then, the population reaches a stationary state where
all birds behave individually or colonially, with a sharp
phase transition at p = 0.5. This result can be obtained
by estimating the balance between costs and benefits of
each type of behavior for the whole population. Thus, the
learning scheme described by this model is guaranteed to
lead to the optimal behavior if the learning ability, or the
memory, of the birds was infinity. Near p = 0.5 we find a
very long lived transient, which tends to become a power
law decay, in line with the critical slowing down near a
second order phase transition [36]. In this sense, one con-
sider the stationary distribution at finite lifespans (fig. 1)
as the equivalent of finite size effects near a continuous
phase transition.
B. Individual scoring model
It is equally or more consistent with existing field data
to assume that each bird makes all choices according to
its own experiences. This requires to modify the scor-
ing assigned to the strategies not followed by each bird,
defined in table II. The simplest choice is to assume
that, when unsuccesful (predated), the bird assigns to the
FIG. 1: Results for m = 2, s = 5, N = 1000 and v = 9.
Top, temporal evolution of the model for different predation
pressures, from t = 1 to t = 16384, Bottom, distribution of
colony sizes for the same temporal evolution.
FIG. 2: Results for m = 2, s = 5, N = 10000 and v → ∞.
Top, temporal evolution of the model for predation pressures
for different predation pressures, from t = 1 to t = 16384.
Bottom, distribution of colony sizes for the sam e temporal
evolution. Note the change in the range of values of p studied
with respect to those shown in fig. 1
4Choice Success ∆i ∆c
Individual
Predated
Not Predated
0
2
1
0
Colonial
Predated
Not Predated
2
0
0
1
TABLE III: Scoring in a Individual Model. ∆i is the increase
on the score of a strategy that gives an individual outcome
and ∆c is the increase on the score of a strategy that gives a
colonial outcome.
strategies leading to the option not followed the score cor-
responding to the benefit of that behavior in the absence
of predation, as shown in table III. A bird who made a
succesful choice (not predated), updates only the scores
of those strategies which lead to that choice. Finally, we
assume that the predation pressure is not the same for all
colonial birds, as they form colonies of different sizes. In
order to take this into account, we distribute the colonial
birds into colonies which sizes follow a power law distri-
bution. The number of colonies of size w is proportional
to w−1. This is the expected behavior if the relative fluc-
tuation of colony sizes is random. The distribution is
normalized to the number of colonial birds.
At each time step, which corresponds to one breeding
season, there is a finite probability p that a nest will be
predated. Unless otherwise stated, the predation proba-
bility, p is constant in time, though the inclusion of vari-
able probability does not change the results qualitatively.
As in the previous case, individual strategies, when
successful, obtain a larger score than colonial strategies
(2 vs. 1), reflecting the innate (or genetic) preference of
birds to individual breeding in the absence of predation.
We have studied the temporal evolution of the number
(or frequency) of colonial breeders, for different values of
m, s and v, performing simulations for each combination
of these three parameters from p = 0.01 to p = 0.99.
In fig. 3 we can observe that the qualitative features are
equivalent for v = 3 and v = 15, however with longer
lifespan, birds can learn more, and therefore the adapta-
tion process is clearer for v = 15. These results are in
agreement with field studies [18].
C. Modelling colony distributions
Finally, we will consider explicitly the influence of the
colony size distribution, which is not taken as given.
We start with a population of individual birds, nb, dis-
tributed among ns sites, where nb ≪ ns. Birds have
two possible strategies or behaviors, individual or colo-
nial, which have a score which reflects the reproductive
success that a bird would have if it would have followed
it. Note that we do not make use here of the set of the
strategies of the MG (such as in table I), but only these
two stretegies, as well as the information of the previ-
ous time step. These birds are predated, and use scoring
FIG. 3: Results for m = 1, s = 4, N = 10000. Temporal
evolution of the individual scoring model from t = 1 to t =
10000, in the cases of predation pressures from p = 0.01 to
p = 0.99 , for v = 3 (top) and v = 15 (bottom).
rules similar to those described in the previous subsec-
tion, and given in table III. Birds which, at a given time
step, choose to follow colonial behavior, join an existing
colony. At the beginning, as no colonies still exist, birds
which acquire this behavior are paired among them. A
given colonial bird has the same probability of joining
any one of the existing colonies [37]. Otherwise the bird
(couple) nests in one of the available empty sites. When
the score of a bird is taken to zero, the (new) bird has
an innate tendency towards individual behavior. Finally,
and guided by field observations, we have considered the
case where birds make new choices every season, and the
case where birds which have not been predated repeat the
previous choice, and only consider their possible choices
if they have been predated.
The model leads to different colony distributions. In
general, after some transients, large colonies appear and
grow indefinitely, leading to distributions skewed towards
large sizes. In this respect, the model differs from the
two cases considered previously. In the model discussed
in III A, the growth of large colonies was arrested be-
cause birds were able to appraise the collective perfor-
mance of colonial birds. For the individual model in III B,
we assumed a fixed distribution of possible colony sizes.
By combining an individual scoring procedure and not
imposing constraints on the distribution of colony sizes,
we find that the average size drifts towards large values,
induced by the dilution of predation presure for large
colonies.
This tendency towards large colony sizes, for arbitrar-
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FIG. 4: Fit to the average colony distribution for a population
of approximately 300 couples of lesser kestrel in Los Monegros
(Spain) [18]. The number of couples is 300, and the number
of available sites where colonies can be formed is 15000. The
predation pressure is p = 0.08, and there is a finite probability
of catastrophic events, pcat = 0.01, which limits the maximum
colony size to ∼ 100.
ily small predation may help to explain the existence to-
day of species which form very large colonies, like pen-
guins and other sea birds. In many cases, however, there
is an upper limit to the maximum size that a colony can
have, because of the different disadvantageous effects of
colonies, such as parasitism, transmission of diseases, lack
of food on the vicinity of the colony and the attraction of
big predators to big colonies. We have incorporated this
possibility by assuming that there are catastrophic events
which act on all members of a colony, and which proba-
bility increases with the size of the colony. Similar effects
are obtained if the probability of predation includes the
possibility that there are events where a whole colony is
predated.
The present model, including (few) catastrophic events
which limit the maximum colony size, allows us to fit
observed colony distributions [18]. A fit to results for
colonies of lesser kestrels in Los Monegros (Spain) is
shown in figure 4. The predation pressure is p = 0.08, the
average lifetime is v = 5, and the ratio between the suc-
cess of individual birds and colonial birds, in the absence
of predation, is ∆i/∆c = 2. We also assume a catas-
trophic predation pcat = 0.01. This implies that colonies
cannot grow to sizes much larger than 100.
When we introduce an upper cutoff the maximum
colony size, the numerical results are very suggestive of
a rounded second order phase transition, as in the cases
0 25
0
100
200
300
p = 0.06
0 25
p = 0.08
0 25
p = 0.10
FIG. 5: Colony distributions obtained for a population of 3000
couples, and p = 0.06, left, p = 0.08, center, and p = 0.10,
right.
discussed in III A and III B. We find a regime where
most birds choose individual strategies, for low predation
pressure, and a regime where most birds form colonies.
The main difference with the previous cases is that the
critical predation pressure, pc, at which this transition
takes place, is now lower. Our results suggest that, in
the present case, pc ≈ 0.08. This reduction in the value
of pc is consistent with the enhanced tendency towards
coloniality in this version of the model. The evolution
towards a stationary state is very slow, and, for the pa-
rameters used, at least 103 time steps are required.
It is interesting to note that the best value of p which
fits the observed broad distribution of colony sizes is close
to the critical value which separates the two regimes de-
scribed earlier. This is best appreciated in fig. 5, where
we have repeated the calculations which lead to fig. 4,
p = 0.08, and also p = 0.06 and p = 0.10, for a pop-
ulation of 3000 birds, and leaving all other parameters
unchanged. These results suggest that the assumption
of a power law distribution of colony sizes, made in III A
and III B is consistent.
IV. CONCLUSIONS.
Our results suggest that colonial behavior can arise
as a natural response to predation pressure. Note that
we made a number of conservative assumptions, in or-
der to avoid any bias towards colonial behavior: i) The
birds have an innate tendency towards preferring individ-
ual nests, ii) The only protection provided by the colony
6is the dilution effect, iii) The distribution of colonies is
such that small colonies are more abundant, and, in some
variations of the model, iv) predation pressure fluctuates
strongly from year to year, allowing for the existence of
periods of low predation.
The number of colonial birds increases with increas-
ing lifespan, as birds accumulate experience for a longer
period. This evidence is in agreement with the obser-
vation that birds make use of their long term breeding
experiences[38, 39, 40, 41].
The models used here are inspired in the minority game
model, and use similar definitions of allowed choices and
strategies. On the other hand, agents use their individual
experiences in order to update the scores of the different
strategies, and the payoffs are related to a random event,
the chance of being predated.
Our results suggest that simple mathematical models
of predation pressure on colonial birds can lead to a dy-
namical phase transition, in which a majority of birds
change from colonial to individual breeding behavior.
This transition is smoothed due to the finite lifespan of
the birds, which limits the ability to learn new behaviors.
Note, however, that the models used in the present work
cannot be expressed in terms of the minimization of a
benefit function.
Finally, it is intriguing that field observations [18] can
be fitted by the model in III C by tuning the parameters
to be close to the critical point discussed above, suggest-
ing some kind of self critical organization [42].
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